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Judicial review is one of the classical issues in constitutional law.1 It is not practiced in every 
system and even in the systems where it is practiced, there are different variations. For a long time it 
has been recognised that, whatever the differences might be, it is certainly not a uniquely American 
institution.2 Anine Kierulf’s book tells the story of judicial review in Norway. She has penned a 
dense narrative that is rich with detail on how this Nordic system has balanced democracy and 
judicial oversight for two hundred years. 
 
Kierulf is a Norwegian lawyer who presently functions as a director at the Norwegian National 
Human Rights Institution. Previously she was a researcher at the Norwegian Institute of Human 
Rights at the University of Oslo. This book is thematically very close to Kierulf’s PhD dissertation, 
which was titled as Taking judicial review seriously: the case of Norway (2014). Kierulf is not pure 
legal scholar but someone who has first practiced law as a professional lawyer. This background 
shows in the book’s use of sources and discussions which is both a boon and a bane. On the one 
hand, it gives clarity for the book that is structured chronologically and centers on key cases 
decided by the Norwegian Supreme Court. On the other hand, her manner of using sources is very 
scarce, almost minimalistic, and scholarly readers might be less enthusiastic about the fact that she, 
mostly, omits detailed page references throughout the book. However, what is possibly lost with 
scholarly details is certainly gained when it comes to readability. 
 
In essence, this book is about the countermajoritan difficulty that is most often discussed against the 
backdrop of the US system.3 Kierulf successfully combines the classical judicial review debate with 
the much later emergence of supranational courts; she focuses in particular on the effects of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the case law by the European Court of Human Rights. 
Although she does not promote her own position strongly, she defends judicial review as it has been 
practiced in Norway. In this sense, the historical narrative of this book is designed to justify judicial 
                                                             
1 See Doreen Lustig and J H H Weiler, Judicial review in the contemporary world—Retrospective and prospective, 16 
INT'L J. CONST. L. 315 (2018) (Discusses global waves of judicial review within constitutional orders.) 
2 See Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1017 (1970).   
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SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-18 (1986). 
review and counter those arguments that would regard judicial review as undemocratic or 
illegitimate. It is no small feat to be able to present an interesting, detailed, and yet very readable 
story of 200 years of constitutional history of a country in less than three hundred pages. I doubt 
that someone with a purely academic background would have been able to do this in such a short 
space. 
 
The book is structured chronologically. After the first two introductory chapters, Kierulf explains in 
Chapter 3 how judicial review took place and how it was shaped in 1800s. For comparatists it is 
interesting to note that although Norway is basically a civil law country, it does not have separate 
courts for administrative matters, i.e. courts have general jurisdiction and the doctrine of stare 
decisis (in its Norwegian version) is practiced. Moreover, one may also be surprised to learn how 
significant the role of American constitutional doctrine has always been in Norway.  
 
In many ways, Norway’s constitutional law and legal culture differ somewhat from those of other 
Nordic systems. However, in some places comparison with other Nordic countries would have been 
beneficial because Kierulf seems to think that certain features are Norwegian specialties although 
they are typically common Nordic features. Two such issues are the discussion on the necessity of 
clear breach as a requirement for judicial review and courts’ characteristic reliance on preparatory 
materials (travaux préparatoires).4 It is a bit problematic that the author knows Marbury v. 
Madison (1803) better than she knows the other Nordic systems, which do have, despite certain 
differences, also significant similarities. In any case, readers learn how Norwegian judicial review 
was practiced first very early after the enactment of the Constitution in 1814. The other striking 
feature of Norwegian judicial review is the significance of the liberal arguments or the significance 
of constitutional rights from early on.  
 
The following chapter (Chapter 4) tells the story of how the regulatory state emerges in Norway and 
how judicial review related constitutional arguments lose some of their weight and pertinence 
during the early 1900s. This century starts with a period of fairly active judicial review which ends 
with the Waterfall case in 1918. This case caused a debate, in which proposals to abolish judicial 
review were put forward because some legislators felt that the court interfered with the legislative 
power. In the debate, however, the argument for the Constitution as the lex superior became central. 
Accordingly, judicial review persisted. Yet, the  tension between popular sovereignty based 
                                                             
4 See Jaakko Husa, A Constitutional Mentality, in NORDIC LAW IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT 41 (Letto-Vanamo et al. eds., 
2019). 
political constitutionalism arguments and courts practicing judicial review (legal constitutionalism) 
was made explicit in this case and has been underlying Norwegian debates ever since. Kierulf’s 
own bottom line is clear: ‘The mere fact that the Supreme Court at times decides cases based on a 
different interpretation of the Constitution than that of Parliament does not itself make review 
outcomes “bad”’ (p. 106). For a reader, this passage is very informative concerning both the subject 
and how the author positions herself in the debate. 
 
In Chapter 5, concentrating on the period of Post-World War II, the narrative is bound around the 
most important Norwegian case of judicial review: the Kløfta case decided in 1976. This case 
became later a kind of a central point of reference concerning modern Norwegian constitutional 
review.5 Kierulf does not waste time on wartime happenings but transports her readers relatively 
speedily to 1960s and 1970s. After World War II there were very few cases of constitutional review 
and in the 1960s it started to look like judicial review was perhaps a thing of the past that had no 
place in the emerging welfare state. Nevertheless, Kløfta changed all that and has anchored 
constitutional review firmly in Norwegian constitutional doctrine until today. By a narrow 9-8 
majority the Supreme Court signalled its willingness to return to a more strict form of constitutional 
review especially in the area of civil rights.  
 
This case was a typical Norwegian constitutional judicial review case, most of the cases deal with 
the right to property or right to own property, because it was about right to property and 
expropriation. Now, even though the court was divided on other issues, both the majority and 
minority held the principle of judicial review itself to be undisputable. Although it took eight years 
for the government to react to the judgment and change the statute, it ultimately did react. This is 
not an important case only for Norway; the reader feels that it is an important case for the author, 
too. So, the reader is not surprised when Kierulf, somewhat ironically, quotes Torstein Eckhoff’s 
dramatically failed prediction (from 1975) according to which ‘I doubt these powers will ever be 
used again in any way worth mentioning’ (at 135). 
 
Chapter 6 brings in Kierulf’s second key dimension, which is the ECHR and how it gradually 
becomes an elemental part of the Norwegian constitutional system. Norway ratified the Convention 
in 1951 and accepted the competence of the ECtHR in 1964. This chapter explains how the ECHR 
                                                             
5 For an interesting comparison between Norway and Finland, that takes Kløfta into account, see Veli-Pekka 
Hautamäki, Authoritative Interpretation of the Constitution: A Comparison of Argumentation in Finland and Norway, 6 
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was adopted and provides an overview of the constitutional debates among politicians and scholars 
regarding Norway’s accession to the Convention and its potential impact on the national 
constitutional system. In essence, the narrative highlights the road towards the adoption of the 
Human Rights Act of 1999 (HRA). Constitutionally, the key provision of the HRA is § 3, which 
states that the Convention takes precedence in cases of conflict with other legislative provisions. 
Interestingly, the HRA thus resembles the equivalent instrument in the UK; it brought about a 
debate on the significance of national parliament whose legislative power was feared to be 
overshadowed by supranational judicial bodies. Unfortunately, Kierulf does not draw comparisons 
to the UK because her focus is so heavily on the national scene. Nevertheless, the reader gets a 
balanced and well thought out picture of how the ECHR intertwines with the Norwegian 
Constitution when it comes to Norwegian courts and in particular the Supreme Court: 
‘The way in which Norwegian courts have employed rights review under the 
Constitution in many respects resembles the way they engage the ECHR as a 
constitutional minimum standard or rights guarantee. In very few cases has the 
Supreme Court disregarded a Norwegian provision because it conflicts with the 
ECHR; the usual way of resolving conflicts in meetings between a ECHR norm and a 
national norm is through interpreting the Norwegian provision in light of the ECHR, 
and harmonizing it so as to avoid conflict.’ (at 160) 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the problems and issues concerning the dual review (national review alongside 
international) during 2000-2010 by concentrating on two cases and their ramifications. Both of the 
cases deal with the freedom of expression, clearly a key area of interest for the author. The first case 
deals with personal reputation and the second with political advertising. Kierulf concentrates on the 
constitutional and human rights implications rather than explaining every single detail – an 
approach that by and large, serves readers well; however, it is difficult to avoid a feeling that much 
of this chapter perhaps stretches too far away from the main theme of the book. Nevertheless, the 
discussion displays clearly the expertise of the author and her mastery of the substantive 
constitutional issues in these cases.  
 
Next, Chapter 8 tells a story of the year 2010 that sparked a renewed general interest in judicial 
review. The background of the debate is formed by three cases decided by the Supreme Court in 
different areas of law. The Shipping Tax, Church Endowment Foundation, and War Crimes cases 
bring judicial review and the ECHR to the forefront once again. Even though there were some 
doubts concerning the role of courts in a democratic society, overall, the debate stirred by these 
cases seem to confirm how deeply judicial review is embedded in the Norwegian constitutional 
system. Moreover, the story, as it is told by Kierulf, underlines and confirms the key argument of 
the book:  
 
‘The cases make clear the established position of constitutional review. The Kløfta 
case may have represented the start of review renaissance, and was formative in 
elucidating the Constitution and judicial review still being a reality.’ (at 226) 
 
One thing that raises questions is how the lack of a Nordic comparative dimension affects the way 
in which Norway is presented in the book. Nordicness is a part of the Norwegian system even 
though judicial review has a more prominent role to play there than in the other Nordic countries. 
The author does not make this point, but from a Nordic comparative perspective, one of her key 
findings seems typical: Parliament’s views on constitutionality are taken into account and they have 
significance, in particular when courts are in doubt about the constitutional question.6 
 
Chapter 9 is rather short and it addresses rights reform and the constitutionalisation of judicial 
review. It explains how and why the Constitution was amended with several new provisions in 2014 
containing many new rights, not previously codified in the constitutional document. It also shows 
how judicial review finally found its way into the written text of the Constitution in 2015. Kierulf 
also registers how these reforms increased instances of courts citing or mentioning the Constitution. 
Furthermore, the chapter contains an interesting sub-narrative explaining how the Norwegian 
Labour party eventually changed its critical view on judicial review, which made it possible to 
amend the Constitution and include the doctrine of judicial review formally into the text of the 
Constitution. However, as she writes in the concluding Chapter 10, it is to be expected that 
discussions on the legitimacy of review will persist and that ‘disagreements over how review is 
practiced from case to case will continue to spark debate’ (p. 260). Her point on this continued 
debate is, however, very enlightening because she separates result-based critiques (frequent and 
unavoidable) from critiques that go deeper and concern the system of constitutional review (less 
frequent). 
 
Perhaps the most intriguing dimension of the book is how Kierulf is able to tell a story not only 
about constitutional law, but also about how judicial review is entangled with politics and legal 
culture. She shows how judicial review evolves as a part of the system from something that is at 
first a conservative bulwark against progressive political forces, but later transforms into a central 
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feature of a democratically legitimate constitutional system. In the last pages of the book, the author 
discusses the possibility of a constitutional advisory board working in the parliament. That makes 
sense; however, the lack of comparative viewpoints makes this discussion somewhat thin.7 In the 
end, the book defends the legitimacy of judicial review and its natural role in Norwegian 
democracy. 
 
Although this is a case study of a one system, it shows how generally recognised constitutional 
arguments apply to most systems of judicial review in one form or another: the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty is not only a Norwegian issue but is recognised around the world. Kierulf’s solution to 
construct her story around essentially two landmark cases (Waterfall and Kløfta) helps to keep the 
plot together throughout the book.8 For this reviewer, it was a surprise to learn how constitutional 
review has been so consistently doubted and debated in Norway; in my own scholarship, I had 
thought that judicial review was accepted as a more standard part of Norwegian constitutionalism 
even before it was finally codified. Accordingly, it is easy to recommend this book to anyone 
interested in constitutional review in general and not just to those who have a special interest in 
Norway or the Nordic systems. Kierulf manages to show that the Norwegian version of judicial 
review provides a useful perspective on the dichotomy of American and European forms of 
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7 About division of powers in the Nordic constitutional systems, see Thomas Bull, Institutions and Divisions of Power, 
in THE NORDIC CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL STUDY 43 (Krunke and Thorarensen eds., 2018). 
8 She deals, of course and as mentioned in this review, with many other cases too. However, for her narrative these two 
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